The Incomplete Logic of Limited War
Imagine fighting a foreign war that half the domestic population passively supports, and the other half of the population passively opposes, and everyone actively ignores. Let's say that things are going badly in this war, at least as perceived at home. Now, let's say that withdrawal is a very costly option because it means reneging on commitments made, leaving a vacuum of political chaos, and the conditions for civil war in a (hypothetically) very hot part of the world. Let's also say that the very political forces that argue for withdrawal, are the same ones that will clamour for "peace-keeping" intervention as soon as the effects of the withdrawal and subsequent ethnic conflict are felt.
The limited nature of foreign wars by great powers means that the domestic population of the great power has just enough inertia to support "some" war, but not the political will to apply the resources necessary to achieve decisive outcomes. The asymmetry of powerful imperial militaries against small local insurgencies is matched by an asymmetry of political will.... Limited political will on the part of imperial forces and decisive political will on the part of indigenous warriors.
The tragedy of the limited political commitment of the imperial force is that it is committed just enough to incur substantial costs, but not enough to decisively impose a lasting order. At home, any increase in resources for a foreign war is seen as "escalation", as if wars are fought by degrees. The hypothetical limited warrior will say "We can't escalate this war from 20% to 34%, because the 20% is already to heavy a burden." The logic of limited political commitment is a sufficient condition for the success of a guerrilla insurgency. As soon as the empire has decided that the costs are too great to subdue effectively, but too great to withdraw definitively, the tragedy of limited war is present and conflict is sure to persist.
The hypothetical great statesman will look at any conflict as a means to an end, and thus a transitory state to a more acceptable political situation. The way to end conflict is either definitive (potentially costly) withdrawal or decisive and costly commitment. The logic of decisive commitment sounds something like this:
"We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old." Sir Winston Churchill
The tragedy of limited logics and divided publics, led by lesser statesmen, is that those who abhor conflict (which should be all) cannot agree on a decisive strategy: withdraw or win. And as the epic struggle endures, it drains the vitality of the warring polities until even the eventual winner will likely collapse under the strain of its own success. And surely no one can envy having to choose between the overwhelming, bloody assault and the torture of an enduring and underwhelming deadlock.
The limited nature of foreign wars by great powers means that the domestic population of the great power has just enough inertia to support "some" war, but not the political will to apply the resources necessary to achieve decisive outcomes. The asymmetry of powerful imperial militaries against small local insurgencies is matched by an asymmetry of political will.... Limited political will on the part of imperial forces and decisive political will on the part of indigenous warriors.
The tragedy of the limited political commitment of the imperial force is that it is committed just enough to incur substantial costs, but not enough to decisively impose a lasting order. At home, any increase in resources for a foreign war is seen as "escalation", as if wars are fought by degrees. The hypothetical limited warrior will say "We can't escalate this war from 20% to 34%, because the 20% is already to heavy a burden." The logic of limited political commitment is a sufficient condition for the success of a guerrilla insurgency. As soon as the empire has decided that the costs are too great to subdue effectively, but too great to withdraw definitively, the tragedy of limited war is present and conflict is sure to persist.
The hypothetical great statesman will look at any conflict as a means to an end, and thus a transitory state to a more acceptable political situation. The way to end conflict is either definitive (potentially costly) withdrawal or decisive and costly commitment. The logic of decisive commitment sounds something like this:
"We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old." Sir Winston Churchill
The tragedy of limited logics and divided publics, led by lesser statesmen, is that those who abhor conflict (which should be all) cannot agree on a decisive strategy: withdraw or win. And as the epic struggle endures, it drains the vitality of the warring polities until even the eventual winner will likely collapse under the strain of its own success. And surely no one can envy having to choose between the overwhelming, bloody assault and the torture of an enduring and underwhelming deadlock.
posted by Lt Smash at 1:44 PM
2 Comments:
I disagree with a main premise in your argument: the assumption that the war can be won "if only we had the will to win it." It seems to me like the argument being made is that if we send "enough" troops, we will be able to "bring order" to the destabilized region in question. I don't accept that, and this is why:
How many troops have already been committed by the world's governments to fight in region "x"? (We might as well acknowledge that we're all talking about Afghanistan ...) In any event, what is the magical #, over and above the 10s of thousands already serving there? You see, it's easy for the military to insist on more resources when they are in the heat of a campaign, disconnected to the reality "back home". The problem is that there never seems to be a specific final amount in terms of financial and human resources, possibly because nobody can know for certain how all the different factors will play out. Will 10,000 more troops deployed win us the war? Or 100,000? 1,000,000 maybe? The US has spent billions of dollars and years trying to reach this goal!And what if the war isn't winable? How many "terrorists" do we have to kill before "peace" can be imposed on region "x"? What happens if we become so entrenched that we become like the hated colonizers of not so many years ago ...?
You know, it's easy to talk about "what needs to be done" to make a difference around the world. The problem is from what vantage point you are speaking, because let's face it, everyone has a vested interest in war and peace. If Canadians "knew" that x number of troops were needed over x number of years to achieve a specific result, then we could have meaningful discussions about Canadian involvement. As it stands, most Canadians don't know why we're "over there", what we're doing, or how long our involvement is supposed to last. The military, for all its talk of "weak political and public will" to fight wars, should invest some of that multi-billion dollar budget into explaining it to the layman and woman, for whom fighting a war in a foreign country is meaningless. And who can blame them? It's said that there are one million homeless in Canada ... do you think they care about spending billions of dollars on upgrading military equipment? And maybe we need to spend that money ... but it needs to be more clearly explained in a much more nuanced manner, not used like a stick to slap us in our collective face for having the nerve to ask why we should be fighting half way around the world, and how we, with a population of some 35 million, plan to "make a real difference".
Do yourselves a favour and visit http://www.cbc.ca/22minutes/video.html, go to November 21, 2006, and watch "I support our troops!"
At the least, you'll get a laugh ... hopefully ...
Post a Comment
<< Home